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Abstract: We argue that solving the heterogeneous problems arising from
the standard game theory requires looking both at reasoning heuristics, as
in Colman’s analysis, and at how people represent games and the quanti-
ties that define them.
Colman’s elegant and persuasive article describes psychological
game theory by introducing formal principles of reasoning, and fo-
cuses on several nonstandard reasoning processes (team reason-
ing, Stackelberg reasoning, and epistemic and nonmonotonic rea-
soning). The goal is to explain psychological phenomena in
game-playing that orthodox game theory, and its conventional ex-
tensions, cannot explain. We argue that, in addition, a model is
needed of how the economic agent perceives and mentally repre-
sents the game initially, before any (strategic) reasoning begins.
For instance, the perceived utility of various outcomes might
change depending on the previous games seen.
As an illustration of such a possible model, here we offer some
initial results from a research program that aims to ground ac-
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counts of rationality in general, and decision theory in particular,
on the underlying cognitive mechanisms that produce the seem-
ingly paradoxical behavior. Colman’s sections 2 and 4 discuss the
basic underlying assumptions of expected utility theory and game
theory. Existing models of rational choice and interactive game-
theoretic decision making typically assume that only the attributes
of the game need be considered when reaching a decision; that is,
these theories assume that the utility of a risky prospect or strat-
egy is determined by the utility of the outcomes of the game, and
transforms the probabilities of each outcome. Decisions are as-
sumed to be based on these utilities.
Our results demonstrate, however, that the attributes of the
previously seen prospects and games influence the decisions in
the current prospect and game, which suggests that prospects and
games are not considered independently of the previously played
ones (Stewart et al., in press; Vlaev & Chater, submitted). In par-
ticular, Stewart et al. (in press) have revealed the phenomena of
“prospect relativity”: that the perceived value of a risky prospect
(e.g., “p chance of x”) is relative to other prospects with which it
is presented. This is counter to utility theory, according to which
the perceived value of each prospect should be dependent only on
its own attributes. Stewart et al. suggest that this phenomenon
arises in the representation of the magnitudes that define the
prospects, and suggest that the phenomenon has a common ori-
gin with related effects in the perception of sensory magnitudes
(Garner 1954; Laming 1997; Lockhead 1995).
We have found similar effects, providing a new type of anomaly
for orthodox game theory. People play repeated one-shot Pris-
oner’s Dilemma games (Vlaev & Chater, submitted). The degree
to which people cooperate in these games is well-predicted by a
function of the pay-offs in the game, the cooperation index as pro-
posed in Rapoport & Chammah (1965). Participants were asked
on each round of the game to predict the likelihood that their
coplayer will cooperate, and then to make a decision as to whether
to cooperate or defect. The results demonstrated that the average
cooperation rate and the mean predicted cooperation of the co-
player in each game strongly depend on the cooperativeness of the
preceding games, and specifically on how far the current game was
from the end-points of the range of values of the cooperation in-
dex in each session. Thus, in games with identical cooperation in-
dices, people cooperated more and expected more cooperation 
in the game with higher rank position relative to the other coop-
eration index values in the sequence. These findings present an-
other challenge to the standard rational choice theory and game
theory, as descriptive theories of decision-making under uncer-
tainty, and also to other theories where games are independently
considered.
Our proposed account for these results, and also for other prob-
lems related to the independence assumption, is that people have
poor notions of absolute cooperativeness, risk, and utility, and in-
stead make their judgments and decisions in relative terms, as is
described in some existing psychophysical and cognitive theories
of perception and judgment of information about magnitudes (in-
tensities of stimulus attributes). Thus, this account departs funda-
mentally from previous work in this field, by modeling the highly
flexible and contextually variable way in which people represent
magnitudes, like sums of money, probabilities, time intervals, co-
operativeness, and so forth, rather than by assuming that these can
be represented on absolute internal psychological scales (i.e., even
if these scales exist, they stretch or contract depending on the
other stimuli in the environment). We conjecture that the results
from the two studies presented here suggest that people use con-
text as a sole determinant of the utility of a strategy, which is a form
of a more ecologically adaptive rationality, and therefore any de-
scriptive account of game-theoretic behavior, especially in se-
quential social dilemmas, should incorporate a model of agents’
lower-level cognitive perceptual processes.
This discussion does not answer the paradoxes posed in the tar-
get article, but here we would like to make the stronger claim that
there are many more phenomena that the standard approach can-
not explain (and there will be more to be discovered), and that in
order to develop a decent account of human decision behavior in
games, a much more radical approach is needed. Our results im-
ply that Colman’s version of psychological game theory, as based
only on nonstandard forms of reasoning, needs to be supple-
mented by a more general “cognitive game theory,” which grounds
decision-making in the underlying cognitive mechanisms that pro-
duce the decision behavior. Such a cognitive approach could also
include collective rationality criteria (which, as Colman states, are
lacking in the standard decision theory), because, for example, cat-
egorization of the coplayer as being very similar to me could
strongly affect my common belief in each other’s rationality, or at
least in the similarity of the reasoning processes that we would em-
ploy. Also, the perception of the players and the game as being
similar to a previous interactive situation, in which the coplayers
acted in a certain way (e.g., chose a certain focal point), would en-
force the belief that, in the current situation, the coplayers would
act in a similar way.
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